Abstract
Introduction
This paper reports on the laboratory examination of the susceptibility of markets for electric power to price volatility and the allocative efficiency of market based institutions. Significant game theoretic examinations have been performed in both subject areas, primarily relating to the Californian and United Kingdom electricity markets. Both these markets possess simple radial transmission networks, the effect of which can be adequately analyzed through traditional transportation models to explain geographical variations in market performance (Hogan, 1997) . Most electric power markets are far more complicated. To extend existing analysis to these markets (such as the northeastern United States), models must incorporate the laws of physics that govern the operation of transmission networks. At any point in time, hundreds of non-linear constraints bind the operation of any complicated power grid. The computational complexity of determining equilibrium strategies in a multi-player, multi-unit game is too intractable to derive analytical results (Klemperer and Meyer, 1989) . Hence, testing market performance using experimental economics is a practical way to proceed.
Power system operators have long recognized these complexities when assessing the performance of the power grid. Using the same software that determines the commitment of generators, their allocation of load and the flow of power around the shown that this last accepted offer mechanism (LAO) performs as well, or better, than the Vickrey Multiple Unit Auction and alternative uniform price auctions that set the price equal to the first rejected offer (Bernard, 1999) .
Operation of Experiments

Subject Remuneration
It is important that the participants in the experiment received "salient" rewards that To date the experiments implemented using this platform focus on examining the behavior of electricity markets using realistic modeling of the physical transmission network and real human decision-makers.
Its Internet-based architecture eliminates the need for participants to be physically present in a specially equipped laboratory. The POWERWEB server handles application logic, data handling and computation.
Users interact through a standard web browser.
In the electricity markets currently That is competition at work. 1) The market price is set to the reservation price (maximum allowed)
2) The market price is set to the maximum offer submitted
3) The market price is set to the maximum offer submitted, and a two times standby cost is charged for recalling any capacity needed to meet load. This simulates the effect of having supply obligations in a capacity market to be available when needed.
Additional experiments will be run to determine whether the vulnerability of a market to price volatility can be reduced by changing the market structure. The following four structural changes will be considered: 
